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The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited UH1 2005

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The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited: An International Collection of Documents, from the Bay of Pigs to the Brink of Nuclear War

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The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited: An International Collection of Documents, from the Bay of Pigs to the Brink of Nuclear War reproduces a comprehensive collection of records from the archives of the three key governments involved in the most dangerous confrontation of the Cold war. Declassified records from the United States, Russia and Cuba significantly advance analysis of the historical foundations of the missile crisis, the policy calculations and considerations of President John F. Kennedy and premiers Nikita Khrushchev and Fidel Castro, and the overt and covert military and paramilitary operations that combined to bring the world to the threshold of a nuclear exchange. Topics extensively covered in the documentation include the failed U.S.-led invasion at the Bay of Pigs, renewed attempts to overthrow Castro through Operation Mongoose and Operation Northwoods, U.S. military contingency planning for conflict with Cuba, naval warfare, Soviet and Cuban decision making and communications during the crisis, and the repercussions for U.S.-Soviet relations, and Soviet-Cuban relations in its aftermath. Materials were identified, obtained, assembled and indexed by the National Security Archive, a non-profit Washington D.C. based research institute and library. The microfiche collection is accompanied by a printed guide and index.

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

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1964/07/16

16 July 1964

CHRONOLOGY OF AUTONOMOUS OPERATIONSI. Origin of Autonomous Operations

The Integrated Covert Action Program for Cuba, approved by Higher Authority in June 1963, provided for "support of autonomous anti-Castro Cuban groups to supplement and assist in the execution" of the other courses of action approved under this program. The concept of autonomous groups was first voiced in September 1962 in Mr. Walter Rostow's proposal for a "Track Two" approach to Cuban operations. Parallel to the regular CIA-controlled and disciplined Cuban teams, CIA would extend financial aid and a minimum of advice and guidance to independent and uncontrolled Cuban leaders such as Manuel RAY. Implicit in the autonomous concept is the understanding that the leadership would possess a degree of operational self-determination which in certain circumstances, such as during the recent overflight crisis, could conflict with U.S. security interests.

As incorporated into the June 1963 program, the following "rules of engagement" were set forth to govern the conduct of these autonomous operations:

- (1) It is the keystone of autonomous operations that they will be executed exclusively by Cuban nationals motivated by the conviction that

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the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime must be accomplished by Cubans, both inside and outside Cuba acting in consonance.

(2) The effort will probably cost many Cuban lives. If this cost in lives becomes unacceptable to the U.S. conscience, autonomous operations can be effectively halted by the withdrawal of U.S. support; but once halted, they cannot be resumed.

(3) All autonomous operations will be mounted outside the territory of the United States.

(4) The United States Government must be prepared to deny publicly any participation in these acts no matter how loud or even how accurate may be the reports of U.S. complicity.

(5) The United States presence and direct participation in the operation would be kept to an absolute minimum. Before entering into an operational relationship with a group, the U.S. representative will make it clear that his Government has no intention of intervening militarily, except to counter intervention

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by the Soviets. An experienced CIA officer would be assigned to work with the group in a liaison capacity. He would provide general advice as requested as well as funds and necessary material support. He may be expected to influence but not control the conduct of operations.

(6) These operations would not be undertaken within a fixed time schedule.

II. Chronology of Approvals and Discussions at Policy Level Concerning Autonomous Operations, with Particular Emphasis on Manuel ARTIME.

18 June 1963 Meeting of the Standing Group. Discussion and Approval of CIA paper entitled Proposed Covert Policy and Integrated Program of Action Towards Cuba including concept of

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The Standing Group agreed that the paper would be presented with an affirmative recommendation of the Group to Higher Authority.

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autonomous operations
and the rules of
engagement.*

19 June 1963 Meeting with Higher
Authority concerning
the Proposed Covert
Policy and Integrated
Program of Action
Towards Cuba.*

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Higher Authority approved the program
as presented and approved by the Standing
Group.

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9 July 1963 Meeting of the Standing
Group.

Included in this briefing was a status
report that Manuel RAY's JURE was being
supported at the then current rate of
\$10,000 per month and that the operation
of Manuel ARTIME and the MRR had moved
forward rapidly in the past three weeks.

* In both the above meetings the names of both Manuel RAY and Manuel ARTIME were specifically mentioned.

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Particular note was made of the role of Luis SOMOZA and the Nicaraguans in supplying a base, cover, and logistical support to the operation. In addition, a description was given of the Costa Rican political base worked out by ARTIME.

16 July 1963 Meeting of the Standing Group.

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8 Aug 1963 Meeting of the Special Group.

Among other items the question of the disappointingly premature publicity concerning our autonomous operations with ARTIME was raised. The discussion centered around means of counteracting this premature publicity and several suggestions to do so were made. There was no suggestion of changing the autonomous operation concept.

A status report on ARTIME's operation was discussed, particularly Luis SOMOZA's efforts

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to push planned harassment operations in the hope that Castro might launch an offensive against Nicaragua which SOMOZA believed would bring forth U.S. intervention. The Special Group agreed that ARTIME should shift the main weight of his operation to Costa Rica without breaking with SOMOZA and that the State Department would give as much encouragement as possible to Costa Rican support of ARTIME without showing undue U.S. interest in ARTIME's activities.

15 Aug 1963 Meeting of the Special Group.

It was reported that ARTIME agreed to make greater use of Costa Rica in addition to using Nicaragua.

5 Sept 1963 Meeting of the Special Group.

In the course of discussion on possible support to the autonomous anti-Castro exile

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organization, Comandos L, the Special Group was informed that the ARTIME group planned to be ready to go in November.

12 Nov 1963 Meeting at the White House to review the Cuban program.

A full status report on the 6-point integrated program against Cuba was presented. Specific point was made that Manuel ARTIME and the MRR has made substantial progress and expects to mount his first operations in December. In addition it was reported that the Agency was now supporting Manuel RAY to the extent of \$25,000 per month although he has not progressed to the point that ARTIME has. Higher Authority concurred that the program should continue. During this discussion Mr. McGeorge Bundy commented that when the autonomous group started operations this might cause some problems due to the acknowledged lack of tight control. Mr. John A.

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McCone emphasized that to a very considerable extent they were uncontrollable and forecast that once ARTIME was in business we might expect some events to take place which were not exactly to our liking.

14 Nov 1963 Meeting of the Special Group.

The Special Group approved Department of Defense support in the movement of approximately 110 tons of arms from the U.S. to Costa Rica for use in autonomous operations by the ARTIME group.

19 Dec 1963 Meeting at White House, briefing on the Agency Cuban Program.

*No record
in files
J. 904*

In the course of the briefing which included the autonomous operations, Higher Authority asked the cost of these operations and he was informed the total was about \$5,000,000. He also asked the cost of Cuban operations for the current year and was informed it was about \$21 or 22 million.

*ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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6 March 1964 Letter to Mr. McGeorge Bundy reviewing various operational problems in connection with Cuba.

2 April 1964 Meeting of the Special Group.

Our support to the autonomous exile groups headed respectively by Manuel ARTIME and Manuel RAY was again reviewed and a short status report given. The problem of suspending autonomous operations was also briefly discussed. (This letter was later distributed to the Special Group for its meeting of 2 April 1964.)

A separate paper containing a status report on autonomous Cuban exile groups was presented. The problem of these groups and their potential for continuing operations on their own and the momentum of these groups even after support was cut was also discussed. It was clear that the groups headed by ARTIME and RAY constituted a potential threat. Mr. Bundy stated that the time was overdue for submitting to

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Higher Authority the entire question of covert operations against Cuba.

7 April 1964 Meeting at the White House to review the Covert Program against Cuba.

The entire program was reviewed including autonomous operations. Particular attention was paid to CIA-controlled sabotage raiding and autonomous operations. Mr. Mann stated that he leaned away from CIA-conducted raids and towards autonomous operations. Higher Authority was fully briefed on the present status of autonomous operations including the fact that ARTIME was planning to launch his operational program on 12 April. There was some discussion of these plans but no one appeared disposed to try to stop ARTIME. It was pointed out that Manuel RAY's plans were not as well known to us but that RAY had made it clear that he intended to move by May.

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17 April 1964 Memorandum from DCI to
the Special Group.

This memorandum notified Special Group
members of the planned 17/18 April raid
by ARTIME's autonomous group against
Santa Cruz del Sur.

12 May 1964 Verbal notification to
Mr. Crimmins of State
that ARTIME's group
planned to attack
Pilon night of 12 May.

Notification was done at the last minute
because the Agency did not have any precise
information re ARTIME's activities
beforehand.

8 June 1964 Verbal notification to
members of the Special
Group concerning planned
raid against Santa Cruz
del Sur by ARTIME's
autonomous group some-
time between 12 and 15 June.

Mr. Peter Jessup of Mr. Bundy's office,
Mr. Crimmins of State, and Lt. Col. Haig
of Defense, were notified verbally of
the planned raid.

~~EXCERPT~~
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